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Abstract 
This paper empirically examines the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public 
sector efficiency. A country-level dataset is used to measure public sector efficiency in 
delivering education and health services and the new indices are regressed on well-established 
decentralization measures. The analysis is carried out for 21 OECD countries, between 1970 and 
2000. Irrespective of whether public sector efficiency concerns education or health services, an 
inverted U-shaped relationship has been identified between government efficiency in providing 
these services and fiscal decentralization. This relationship is robust across several different 
specifications and estimation methods.  
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1. Introduction 
It has long been recognized that governments differ significantly in the efficiency of 
delivering public services (ref. Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1998; Afonso et al., 2005). Some are 
extremely wasteful and ineffective in performing even basic activities, whereas others achieve 
their objectives systematically and comprehensively. The efforts to increase government 
productive efficiency, otherwise termed public sector efficiency (hereafter referred to as PSE), 
has spawned an output of vital theoretical literature on channels that may affect it. One of the 
most prominent channels is the design of fiscal relations across the various levels of government. 
This study empirically examines the relationship between PSE and fiscal decentralization, using 
country-level macroeconomic data on OECD countries. 
The theoretical literature on fiscal federalism identifies two benchmark channels through 
which fiscal decentralization is expected to affect PSE positively, namely (i) increased electoral 
control and (ii) yardstick competition among local governments that results from 
decentralization.1 According to the electoral control mechanism, decentralization reduces the 
inclinations of officials to divert rents, and increases the probability of “bad” incumbents to be 
voted out of office, thus positively affecting the overall government efficiency (Hindriks and 
Lockwood, 2009). Moreover, Seabright (1996) shows that rent-seeking politicians, when 
contesting in decentralized elections, use incentives to lure the voters in each (local) 
constituency. In contrast, to get re-elected in the national elections politicians would seek to 
please the voters only in a majority of the localities. Similar results are obtained by Hindriks and 
Lockwood (2009) and Myerson (2006). According to the theory of yardstick competition (see 
e.g., Shleifer, 1985; Besley and Case, 1995), citizens are at an advantage when they are able to 
evaluate the performance of their policy makers by comparing the policy choices of their own 
political representatives with the corresponding choices of the neighboring regions’ policy 
makers. Therefore, fiscal decentralization may increase PSE, as it offers citizens an opportunity 
to compare public services and taxes across jurisdictions and helps them to assess whether their 
government wastes resources through low human capital capacity or rent-seeking (Besley and 
Smart, 2007). 
                                                 
1 Barankay and Lockwood (2007) suggest an additional mechanism through which fiscal decentralization may lead 
to increased efficiency, namely a decrease in lobbying by local interest groups. However, as the theoretical literature 
(e.g., Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Bordignon et al., 2003; Redoano, 2003) appears to be rather inconclusive on 
this issue (mainly because under certain conditions there may be more lobbying with decentralization), we prefer not 
to refer to this mechanism as benchmark. 
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However, fiscal decentralization may also exert a negative impact on government efficiency. 
This impact can be attributed to a number of potential advantages gained by the provision of 
public goods by central governments. First, in the presence of economies of scale, higher 
decentralization might lead to a higher average cost of production for the public good (Stein, 
1997). Second, national government bureaucracies are more likely to offer talented people better 
careers and promotion opportunities, which in turn attract higher quality individuals 
(Prud’homme, 1995). Finally, other scholars emphasize the potential danger that local politicians 
and bureaucrats are likely to face, particularly an increase in pressure from local interest groups, 
with these groups being more influential when the size of the jurisdiction is small (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2000; Prud’homme, 1995).    
As the discussion above indicates, the theoretical literature is inconclusive about the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and PSE. If the above considerations were to be 
consolidated, it becomes logical to argue that fiscal decentralization involves both negative and 
positive forces on PSE. Therefore, such arguments could also indicate a potential non-linearity. 
Particularly, in relatively centralized systems, an increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization 
can induce some costs due to diseconomies of scale in the provision of the public good, therefore 
reducing PSE; however, it will also create large gains from an increased electoral accountability. 
Interestingly, in highly decentralized jurisdictions, further increases in decentralization imply 
that diseconomies of scale would prevail over the positive effects of electoral accountability, 
consequently lowering PSE. Therefore, if both views are legitimate, at least to some degree, then 
an inverted U-shaped relationship can be expected between fiscal decentralization and PSE.  
Over the recent years, a small, albeit growing, body of empirical work on the quality of 
governance-fiscal decentralization nexus (Fisman and Gatti, 2002a; Enikolopov and 
Zhuravskaya, 2007) has been observed. Most of these studies measure the quality of governance 
by some internationally comparable outcome of government policy, such as infant mortality, the 
literacy ratio, immunization of population, etc. Also, the key explanatory variable is fiscal 
decentralization, measured as the ratio of sub-national government expenditures (resp. tax 
revenues) to total public spending (resp. tax revenues). Although these studies offer contradicting 
evidence concerning the relationship between the outcomes of government policy and fiscal 
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decentralization, the relationship identified (positive or negative) is always linear.2 However, the 
theoretical hypotheses postulated above are probably not comprehensively addressed by 
employing socioeconomic indicators as measures of “good governance”. This is because such 
measures do not encompass the size of government spending and thus fail to reflect the level of 
efficiency in delivering government services. Barankay and Lockwood (2007) state, “[…] these 
regressions do not estimate government “production functions” because they do not control for 
the inputs to the output that is the dependent variable. […] In the absence of controls for these 
inputs, these regressions cannot tell us much about the efficiency of government, as any observed 
correlation between decentralization and government output can be due to omitted variable bias.” 
To cope with this problem, we develop direct measures of PSE by employing data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) on a panel of 21 OECD countries, between 1970 and 2000. The 
PSE measures are constructed using information on the “inputs” and “outputs” of the public 
sector. Within this framework, we implicitly assume that these indicators are derived from an 
underlying government production relationship. We focus on public education and health and 
construct two alternative PSE indices reflecting government efficiency in delivering services in 
these two sectors. Subsequently, we use the PSE indices to identify the potential public sector 
efficiency-fiscal decentralization nexus.  
We find that PSE increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization up to a certain degree of 
decentralization and thereafter decreases, i.e. revealing an inverted U-shaped relationship. This 
result appears to be robust across a number of different specifications and estimation methods 
that account, inter alia, for the potential reverse causality between fiscal decentralization and 
PSE. Notably, this is the first study to identify such a non-linear pattern, a finding consistent with 
both contradicting stands of the theoretical literature. Also, we are able to calculate the particular 
level of decentralization at which the relationship at hand turns negative and relate this value to 
certain countries. 
                                                 
2 Fisman and Gatti (2002a) and Mello and Barenstein (2001) find that increased decentralization (measured as the 
budgetary share of subnational governments) is associated with lower levels of corruption. Similarly, Fisman and 
Gatti (2002b) and Henderson and Kuncoro (2004) using sub-national data for the US and Indonesia, respectively, 
show that decentralization of public expenditure is effective in reducing corruption only if it is accompanied by an 
increase in power to raise revenue (i.e. increased tax autonomy). Robalino et al., (2001) and Khalegian (2003) in 
cross-country studies, also find support that fiscal decentralization is associated with lower infant mortality and 
immunization rates (taken as measures of the quality of governance). Finally, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) 
examine the effect of decentralization on a set of four indicators of governance quality (namely the three indicators 
used in the studies reviewed above, plus the illiteracy ratio) and conclude that the effects of fiscal decentralization 
are beneficial only in countries that are also characterized by a high degree of political centralization. 
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The rest of the paper includes: Section 2, which describes the empirical model and data used 
in this empirical analysis; Section 3, which illustrates the various econometric methodologies 
employed, as well as discusses the empirical results; and Section 4, which presents the 
conclusions drawn. 
 
2. Empirical model and data 
The empirical model used to study the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public 
sector efficiency is as follows,  
2
0 1 2it it it k it itpse decentralization decentralization controls uα β β β= + + + +  , (1) 
where public sector efficiency itpse  in country i at time t, is expressed as a function of fiscal 
decentralization, a set of control variables and a stochastic term uit. The inclusion of the quadratic 
term reflects the expected inverted U-shaped relationship between PSE and decentralization, as 
discussed in the introduction. To estimate Eq. (1) we first construct the PSE indicators. Next, we 
discuss the data on the variables used in this study.  
We build a panel dataset of 21 OECD countries3 spanning the 1970-2000 period. The 
reason for such a choice is because reliable data are available for these countries to construct the 
PSE indicators and obtain the main explanatory variables for the empirical analysis. The final 
sample is an unbalanced one, comprising a maximum of 522 annual observations. The dependent 
and explanatory variables are discussed below. Explicit definitions and sources for the variables 
used are provided in Appendix A and the descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.   
 
2.1. Measurement of public sector efficiency 
The measurement of PSE and the resulting comparison of the individual countries in the 
context of the efficient functioning of their public sectors, presents a number of difficulties 
related to the scarcity of publicly available country-level data and the complicated problems that 
may emerge in the estimation procedure. In this study, we opt for a direct estimation of PSE, 
using the linear programming technique of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).4 DEA is a linear 
                                                 
3 The set of countries includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.  
4 A number of recent studies instigated an effort towards the computation of PSE indicators using DEA. Concerning 
OECD economies, Afonso et al., (2005) estimate relative efficiency scores for several parts of the public sector 
during the 1980s and the 1990s, while Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005) focused on the efficiency of government 
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programming technique that provides a piecewise frontier, by enveloping the observed data 
points and yields a convex production possibilities set (for a thorough discussion, see Coelli et 
al., 2005). As such, it does not require the explicit specification of a functional form of the 
underlying production relationship. To introduce some notation, let us assume that for N 
observations there exist M inputs in the production of public goods, yielding S outputs. Hence, 
each observation n uses a nonnegative vector of inputs denoted 1 2( , ,..., )
n n n n M
mx x x x R+= ∈  to 
produce a nonnegative vector of outputs, denoted 1 2( , ,..., )
n n n n S
Sy y y y R+= ∈ . Production 
technology {( , ) :  can produce y}F y x x=  describes the set of feasible input-output vectors. 
To measure productive efficiency we an input-oriented DEA model5 of the following form 
(for exposition brevity subscripts t are dropped): 
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where public sector 0 represents one of the N public sectors under evaluation, and xi0 and yr0 are 
the ith input and rth output for public sector 0, respectively. If psei* = 1, then the current input 
levels cannot be proportionally reduced, indicating that public sector 0 is on the frontier. 
However, if psei* < 1, then public sector 0 is inefficient and pse* represents its input-oriented 
efficiency score. Thus, pse∈[0.1].  Finally, k is the activity vector denoting the intensity levels at 
which the N observations are conducted. Note that this approach, through the convexity 
                                                                                                                                                             
spending on education and health. Using similar techniques, Gupta and Verhoeven (2001), Sijpe and Rayp (2007) 
and Afonso et al., (2006) focused on developing countries. Finally, Balaguer-Coll et al., (2007) considered using 
DEA to analyze the efficiency of local governments in Spain.  
5 DEA may be computed either as input or output oriented. Input-oriented DEA shows by how much input quantities 
can be reduced, without varying the output quantities produced. Output-oriented DEA assesses by how much output 
quantities can be proportionally increased, without changing the input quantities used. The two measures provide the 
same results under constant returns to scale but give slightly different values under variable returns to scale. 
Nevertheless, both output and input oriented models will identify the same set of efficient/inefficient public sectors 
(see Coelli et al., 2005). Also, a constant returns to scale assumption is only appropriate when all public sectors are 
operating on an optimal scale (imperfections, asymmetries, etc. are not present), and therefore, we select a variable 
returns to scale specification. 
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constraint 1kΣ =  (which accounts for variable returns to scale) forms a convex hull of 
intersecting planes, as the frontier production plane is defined by combining some actual 
production planes. 
To measure PSE we need to focus on specific areas of government activity. As it is 
impossible to consider all the areas of government activity and the corresponding government 
output, we construct two alternative PSE indicators as proxies of PSE: (i) PSE in providing 
education services and (ii) PSE in providing health services. In our view these two areas of 
government activity have the advantage that the output of both areas is directly measurable.6  
Following the rationale of the relevant literature (see e.g., Afonso et al., 2005; Adam et al., 
2010), we employ the following measures.7 As an output of public education spending, we use 
the years of schooling provided by Barro-Lee (2001) multiplied by the educational quality 
indicator “cognitive” developed by Hanushek and Woessmann (2009). The “cognitive” indicator 
allows us to capture potential qualitative differences on education among different countries. 
Besides, as the educational systems of the OECD countries are far from being homogeneous in 
the sources of spending (private or public), it becomes important to account for the different 
shares of private to public spending on education.8 As such, we multiply the outputs of public 
education spending (i.e. years of schooling multiplied by cognitive) by the ratio of public to total 
spending. Thus, we isolate the impact of private expenditure on output and consequently, we 
don’t give countries characterized by heavy private funding on education an undue advantage. 
As an output of public spending on health, we employ the inverse of the infant mortality 
rate at birth (taken from OECD Health Data, 2007). As in the case of education, we account for 
differences in the shares of private to public spending on health by multiplying the output of 
public spending on health by the ratio of public to total spending on health.9 
                                                 
6 To clarify this argument, consider for example the case of national security, where the proper performance measure 
/ government output would have been the avoidance of external and internal conflicts.     
7 For details on the methodology used and for the summary statistics for the variables employed as outputs and 
inputs, see Appendix A.  
8 In this sample countries characterized by heavy private funding on education such as Australia or the United States 
are included, as well as countries that base the financing of their educational systems on public funds, such as 
Finland and Denmark. 
9 The ratio of public to total spending on health is 41.6% in the United States and 51.9 % in Greece, while it reaches 
88.42% and 87.32% in Sweden and Norway, correspondingly. 
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As input, in the case of PSE in education, we employ public education spending as a share 
of GDP (taken from Busemeyer, 2007), whereas in the case of PSE in health, we employ public 
spending on health as a share of GDP (taken from OECD Health Data, 2007).  
Estimation of program 2 is carried out on annual data to obtain annual indices of PSE in 
providing public education and health services. A panel data approach is used and, therefore, the 
frontier is shaped (is different) at each point in time (each year). We end up with 492 
observations for the PSE education variable and with 597 observations for the PSE health 
variable (see Table 1 for summary statistics). Space constraints prevent reporting the yearly 
values of the indices; therefore, 10-year averages are presented for each country in Fig. 1 (the 
full set of results is available on request). The first set of graphs presents PSE index in providing 
education services (PSE education), while the second set shows the PSE index in providing 
health services (PSE health). Missing values on the PSE indices for some countries reflect 
missing data for the input or the output of the production process. The PSE education figures 
indicate that in the 1970s and 1980s, Australia, Japan, Switzerland and USA reflected high 
efficiency scores, while in earlier years Norway gained much ground. The results are similar in 
the PSE health figures, the exception being Greece and Finland, which were among the best-
performing countries. Overall, these results appear to be reasonable approximations of prior 
academic belief and concur with the findings of earlier research (see e.g., Afonso et al., 2005). 
The yearly values of PSE education and PSE health are used as the dependent variable in the 
subsequent empirical analysis. 
 
2.2. Fiscal decentralization measures 
Approximating the degree of fiscal decentralization has been an issue of considerable 
disagreement in empirical studies. In this paper, we follow the method adopted by Stegarescu 
(2005), who develops a measure of fiscal decentralization based on the detailed data provided by 
OECD (1999). The advantage of the OECD (1999) survey is that it very analytically classifies 
sub-national government taxes based on the degree of decision-making autonomy. Specifically, 
it separates taxes that are set by sub-central governments (i.e. sub-central governments determine 
the tax rate and the corresponding tax base) from those that are determined by the central 
government at a national level and in turn shared with sub-national units. Therefore, Stegarescu’s 
measure of fiscal decentralization reflects the “real” tax-raising autonomy of sub-national units, 
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as it includes as local tax revenues only those taxes strictly determined by sub-national 
governments. This measure has been used in the works by Stegarescu (2005; 2009) and Fiva 
(2006). As a sensitivity analysis we also experiment with the budgetary share of sub-national 
units as recorded by the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics (GFS).10 
The tax revenue decentralization indicator of Stegarescu is referred to as taxrevdec, while the 
GFS decentralization indicator as decindex. For explicit definitions of these measures, see 
Appendix B. Higher values on the two indices reflect higher levels of decentralization. Countries 
with a high level of fiscal decentralization are Switzerland, Canada and Sweden, while Austria, 
Ireland and Netherlands show a low degree of decentralization. Overall, 522 observations are 
available for the taxrevedec index, while a smaller number of observations (481) are available 
for the decindex index.  
 
2.3. Control variables 
To ensure robust econometric identification, we use a number of control variables in the 
estimated equations. First, to control for the overall level of productivity and wealth in the 
economy, we employ the log of real GDP per capita. Data for this variable is from the World 
Banks’, World Development Indicators (WDI) (2004). Countries with higher real income are 
expected to have a more productive private and public sector. In addition, we account for the 
presence of economies of scale in the production of the public good at the country level, by 
controlling for (i) the logarithm of total population, (ii) population density (measured by the 
number of people per square km) and (iii) the share of urban population to total population. Data 
for these variables are from the WDI. Higher values for these variables imply higher potential 
economies of scale in the production of public goods, and thus we expect them to be positively 
associated with PSE indicators.   
                                                 
10 The GFS measure has been employed in Jin and Zou (2002), Davoodi and Zou (1998), Fisman and Gatti, (2002a), 
Enikopolov and Zhuravskaya (2007). However, this widely employed measure includes major shortcomings, as it 
fails to integrate vital aspects of intergovernmental relations. Most importantly, it fails to capture the real degree of 
sub-national governments’ autonomy that is to reflect the degree to which decisions regarding revenues and 
expenditures are truly assigned to lower levels of government (see, Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003; Stegarescu, 2005; 
Barankay and Lockwood, 2007). Evidently, Stegarescu (2005) finds that the GFS measure of tax revenues’ 
decentralization overestimates the extent of fiscal decentralization. This is evident, particularly in the case of Austria 
(28.4% versus 3.5%), Belgium (44.4% versus 24.6%) and Germany (49.4% versus 7.3%). The percentages refer to 
data for the year 2000. 
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According to Alesina et al. (2003), La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), 
countries with high ethno-linguistic fractionalization are expected to exhibit inferior government 
performance for four reasons. First, high ethnic fractionalization results in pressures for 
redistribution between groups (Easterly and Levine, 1997). Second, fractionalization may lead to 
a high demand for publicly-provided private goods, especially those that can be targeted towards 
specific groups (Alesina et al., 2003). Third, it is also possible that a relationship between 
fractionalization and corruption is formed, which will result in higher inefficiency. Finally, in 
more extreme circumstances, increased ethnic fractionalization may lead to ethnic hatred and, 
ultimately, to violent civil wars that disrupt the workings of government (see Fearon, 2003). 
Following Easterly and Levine (1997), we control for ethno-linguistic fractionalization using the 
Herfindahl index, which is calculated on the basis of the share of each separate ethno-linguistic 
group over total population (data are from La Porta et al., 1999). 
To control for the structure of the political system we use two dummy variables. First, we use 
a dummy that takes the value 1 when the electoral system is considered to be majoritarian, and a 
value of 0 otherwise. PSE is expected to be higher in countries that use the majoritarian system, 
as the electoral outcome is generally more sensitive to the incumbent’s performance in 
majoritarian-type elections (Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Persson et al., 2003). Second, we 
consider whether delegation of power affects PSE. Myerson (1993) and Persson and Tabellini 
(2003, 2004), suggest that as presidential regimes create a direct link between individual 
performance and re-appointment in office, the elected officials have strong incentives to perform 
well, which stimulates public sector performance. The potential impact of the presidential 
systems on PSE is captured by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in countries with 
presidential systems, and 0 in those with parliamentary systems. Information on the majoritarian 
and presidential variables is from Persson and Tabellini (2004). 
Another set of variables illustrates the structure of the elected government. First, we control 
for the number of ministers who directly use (spend) part of the government budget (i.e. the total 
number of ministers, excluding the minister of finance). As these ministers are expected to be 
concerned about the size of the budget they control,11 the relationship between the number of 
spending ministers and PSE should be negative. This effect is consistent with the idea that 
                                                 
11 Ministers care about the size of the budget they receive for many reasons, which may include participation in rent-
seeking activities, increase in the size of the bureau they control (Niskanen, 1973) and the ability to make income 
transfers as a means for controlling a larger political clientele.     
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diseconomies of scale may be present in the administration of government (see e.g. Stein, 1997). 
Data for this variable is from Mierau et al. (2007). The variable coalition governments, which is 
obtained from Tavares (2004), is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if a coalition cabinet that 
includes ministers from two or more parties is in power. As the number of parties involved in the 
government increases, the accountability of each of the parties usually diminishes, thus providing 
fewer incentives for efficiency. Also, coalition governments are typically associated with a 
shorter life span (Schofield, 1993; Müller and Strøm, 2000), and therefore are less concerned 
with superior performance. Finally, we account for the effect of electoral cycles by including a 
dummy variable in the empirical analysis, which takes the value of 1 when elections take place 
that particular year (data is from Tavares, 2004).   
Finally, to control for the regulatory environment in the economy we add another dummy 
variable among the regressors, which takes the value 1 when the country has British legal origin 
and zero otherwise. Data for this variable is taken from La Porta et al. (1998). Studies like that of 
Djankov et al. (2003) suggest that countries with common law (British legal origin) take a more 
decentralized approach to solving social problems, whereas civil-law countries follow a more 
regulatory approach. Thus, common-law countries are expected to have less regulations and state 
intervention in the economy and such elements are usually associated with higher efficiency in 
providing public goods. 
  
3. Estimation and results 
3.1. Estimation method and baseline results 
As discussed above, the PSE indicators take values between 0 and 1 (inclusive), with values 
closer to 1 denoting higher efficiency levels. Therefore, an appropriate econometric specification 
corresponds to a censored model of the following general form: 
?
?
0                if   1
1                                           if   1
it k it t it it
it it
pse z u pse
pse pse
α β λ= + + + <
= ≥
 ,    (3) 
where λt corresponds to time-effects common to all countries, ?pse  are the predicted values of the 
regression and the rest of the variables are noted as in Eq. (1) above. By construction, the 
predicted values must be always lower than unity; otherwise they will need to be censored. As in 
the majority of literature that uses macroeconomic indicators over a large time frame, using time-
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effects is crucial to this analysis. In addition, pse has both time and cross-sectional (country) 
dimensions. Thus, panel estimation techniques are used to estimate Eq. (3). Given that we are 
dealing with a censored regression model, we resort here to the panel-data Tobit methodology 
with bootstrapped standard errors. As robustness check we also consider (i) the method proposed 
by Simar and Wilson (2007)12, (ii) a simple panel data fixed effects model and (iii) a GMM 
model for dynamic panels.  
The baseline results are presented in Tables 3 and 4, where the dependent variables are the 
PSE education and PSE health indices, respectively. As inefficiency might cause reform over 
time, all estimated equations include time effects, the results of which are not reported for space 
constraints reasons. In column 1 of Table 3, the coefficient on the decentralization variable is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting a strong positive link between 
fiscal decentralization and PSE in providing education services. The same is true for the 
regression of PSE health (see column 1 of Table 4). Therefore, the results of this study are 
consistent with the part of the theoretical literature that highlights a positive effect of fiscal 
decentralization on PSE through, for example, enhanced electoral control and yardstick 
competition among local governments. Although no prior studies on this relationship using 
macroeconomic data and a direct measure of PSE exist, this result is in line with the findings of 
Barankay and Lockwood (2007), who use micro data on Swiss cantons. 
Following this baseline equation, we examine whether the potential negative effects of 
decentralization prevail when decentralization levels are high. In other words, we look into the 
possible non-linearity in the fiscal decentralization-PSE nexus. In column 2 of Tables 3 and 4 we 
include the squared term of the decentralization variable and we find that the impact of 
decentralization on PSE is indeed non-linear (inverted U-shaped), as the level and the squared 
term of the decentralization variable are statistically significant at the 1% level. Notably, this 
effect remains robust across all specifications in Tables 3 and 4, and thus is irrespective of the 
variable used to proxy PSE or the inclusion of different control variables in the estimated 
equations. Intuitively, although the positive forces of fiscal decentralization mentioned above 
                                                 
12 Simar and Wilson (2007) improve on the econometric inference of models where the dependent variable is 
obtained from linear programming methods, like DEA. However, their method does not apply to panel data. For the 
reasons highlighted above, the panel structure of the dataset in this study is maintained by choice and primarily the 
panel-data Tobit method is used, as it is the conventional one in the literature (Cooper et al., 2004). By using the 
Simar and Wilson method we have to consider only the cross-sectional dimension of our panel (i.e. we cannot pool 
the data).  
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exert a positive impact on PSE, this effect fades out after a certain level of decentralization is 
reached, probably owing to problems associated with the loss of benefits from economies of 
scale (Stein, 1997) and the increasing dependence on local officials, who are selected from a 
lower quality pool of applicants (Prud’homme, 1995). 
 In fact, the level of fiscal decentralization where its impact on PSE becomes negative, can be 
calculated using the ratio [(coefficient on decentralization) / (2*coefficient on the squared term 
of decentralization)]. For the last regression in Table 3, where all the control variables are 
included, this ratio yields a value of 34.46. This value represents the level of fiscal 
decentralization that optimizes PSE in the sample of this study, and is found to be very close to 
the average decentralization values of USA (0.37) and Japan (0.33). The equivalent value for the 
PSE health (last regression of Table 4) is 47.1, which is closer to the average fiscal 
decentralization levels of Canada and Sweden. Certainly, these values are related to estimations 
based on our sample and, thus, should be treated with caution, as they may not be applicable to 
other groups of countries.   
Concerning the remaining explanatory variables, higher GDP per capita is observed to be 
usually associated with higher PSE in providing education and health services, which is intuitive 
because rich / productive countries tend to have a more efficient public sector. Population 
density and the logarithm of population are positive and significant determinants of PSE in both 
Tables 3 and 4, suggesting that higher economies of scale in the production of public goods 
benefit PSE education and health. The impact of urban population is insignificant in the PSE 
education regressions, while it is negative and highly significant in the PSE health regressions. 
The latter result appears puzzling and a plausible explanation may be that in overpopulated 
places, the health systems suffer from overcrowded public hospitals and other medical centers, 
and therefore, diseconomies of scale in the production of services related to health.  
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization appears to affect PSE education negatively, indicating that 
higher population heterogeneity is associated with lower PSE in providing education services. 
This concurs with prior theoretical studies, as countries with a heterogeneous population resort to 
higher redistribution among groups and less spending on productive public goods. However, this 
seems to hold true concerning only the education services, as the fractionalization variable is 
insignificant in the PSE health equations. This finding may possibly be related to the different 
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nature of the two services, with ethnic groups having clearly different cultural preferences 
regarding education services, while requesting homogeneous services in health.  
In column (3) of Tables 3 and 4 we additionally control for the structure of the political 
system, whereas in column (4) we control for the structure of the elected government. Finally, 
specification (5) includes all the control variables. The results show that PSE is lower in 
countries with majoritiarian systems and higher in those with presidential systems; however, the 
effect of these variables is not robust across specifications.13 Also, the public sectors of countries 
with a British legal origin are significantly more efficient in providing health and, more 
importantly, education services. Finally, among the three variables characterizing the structure of 
the elected government and the time of the elections, only the number of spending ministers is 
found to be significantly linked to the PSE measures in this study. In particular, a higher number 
of spending ministers lowers PSE, a result consistent with the idea that diseconomies of scale 
may be present within the government, leading to diminished government output (see Mierau et 
al., 2007).      
 
3.2. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we inquire into the robustness of our baseline results. First, the issue of 
causality is tackled; the central authorities may grant more autonomy to efficient local 
governments (i.e. more fiscal decentralization). In order to treat this potential problem of reverse 
causality, we employ an instrumental variables approach. One obvious choice for an instrument 
is a measure of preference heterogeneity. Higher preference heterogeneity leads to more 
decentralization (Alesina et al., 2005). On the other hand, preference heterogeneity per se is not 
expected to affect public sector efficiency: voters may have different preferences for the 
composition of public spending, but will always opt for efficient production by the public sector.  
To capture voter preferences heterogeneity we construct two indices, using information from 
the World Values Survey (WVS). In particular, the WVS asks individuals how much confidence 
they have in different institutions and organizations. The question is as follows: “I am going to 
name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have 
                                                 
13 This lack of robustness can be attributed to the low variability of both variables, as they are both time invariant. 
Only two countries in the sample have a presidential system, while five countries have a majoritarian system. As 
columns (2) and (4) of Tables 3 and 4 reveal, the main argument presented in this study remains intact, even when 
these two variables are not included in the regression.   
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in them: (i) is it a great deal of confidence, (ii) quite a lot of confidence, (iii) not very much 
confidence or (iv) none at all?” Here, we focus on the answers given by the respondents about 
their confidence in two types of institutions, namely (a) Churches (item E069 in the database) 
and (b) Armed Forces (item E070), and we construct two alternative Herfindahl Concentration 
Indices: 
4
2
1
1 i
i
HCI S
=
= −∑ ,         (4) 
where Si is the share of group that gave each one of the four alternative answers. We use the two 
indices as instruments separately, but we also combine them linearly (using their average) as a 
single instrumental variable characterizing preference heterogeneity. We only report the results 
from the combined instrument, as the rest are very similar. Since we have both our 
decentralization variable and its square as endogenous, we also use the squared term of the 
instrument. In principle, this type of heterogeneity is likely to signal a higher demand for 
decentralized governments with more local autonomy. In contrast, this variable should not have 
any direct causal effect on our indices of PSE. In other words, large variance in the beliefs about 
the confidence in the role of military forces and church are not likely to directly affect public 
sector’s performance in providing health and education services. If anything, the impact of these 
variables on our PSE indices will be through fiscal decentralization.      
We report the results in Table 5. Estimation method is two-stage least squares (2SLS) for 
panel data with fixed effects and robust standard errors. Some observations drop out compared to 
previous tables because of the non-availability of our instrumental variable for three countries, 
namely Greece, Luxembourg and Switzerland. The first-stage results, reported in the upper part 
of Table 5 show that our instruments are highly significant determinants of fiscal 
decentralization in both the education and the health equations. The good fit of the instrumental 
variables is also confirmed by the under-identification and weak identification tests of Anderson 
(1951) and Kleibergen and Paap (2006), that report rejection of the relevant hypotheses (for 
more on these issues, see Baum et al., 2007). In both specifications, the coefficients on 
decentralization and decentralization squared remain statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Thus, we can conclude that reverse causality does not drive the findings of the main analysis 
above.   
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Second, we consider using the decentralization measure of IMF’s Government Financial 
Statistics (GFS), which shows the sub-national revenues as a share of total revenues. The results 
are reported in column (1) of Tables 6 and 7, for both education and health equations, 
respectively, and show that the non-linear impact of fiscal decentralization on PSE is true only 
for the education equation. This probably indicates that using decentralization indicators adjusted 
for actual tax-raising autonomy (i.e. the results of Stegarescu, 2005) describes the present 
relationship more accurately.  
In columns (2) and (3) of Tables 6 and 7 we exclude in turn the Mediterranean and 
Scandinavian countries from our sample. In both the PSE education and PSE health equations, 
the relationship between fiscal decentralization and PSE remains an inverted U-shaped one, 
showing that our main result is not sensitive to the effect of specific regions.  
In equation (4) of Tables 5 and 6, we investigate whether corruption is the element captured 
by our PSE indicators that primarily drives our results. Although PSE involves many types of 
non-productive spending (e.g. personnel expansion, inefficient bureaucratic organization etc.) it 
may also include actual corruption. Then, it may be argued that the effect of decentralization on 
PSE is driven by the effect of fiscal decentralization on corruption. We examine this hypothesis 
by running a simple OLS regression of PSE on corruption and using the residuals as our 
dependent variable.14 The results remain practically unchanged, showing that the PSE indicator 
in this study is a broader measure that encompasses additional elements of public sector 
inefficiency that may include (but are not limited to) personnel expansion (Williamson, 1964), 
lower effort (Wyckoff, 1990) and excessive risk aversion (Peltzman, 1973).15  
In the remaining equations presented in columns (5)-(6) we examine whether our results are 
driven by the econometric method used. In column (5) we present the results obtained from a 
simple panel data fixed effects model and we observe that the non-linear relationship remains 
unaffected. The same is true when we estimate our empirical model using the method of Simar 
and Wilson (2007).16 Although this method treats all observations as cross-sections, the 
estimated coefficients and their significance are very similar to those reported in column (5) of 
Tables 3 and 4 (i.e. the equivalent equations estimated with the Tobit method).         
                                                 
14 To capture corruption we employ data from the International Country Risk Guide (2009) database.  
15 For a comprehensive review, see Wintrobe (1997). 
16 These regressions are carried out using Algorithm 2, as done by Simar and Wilson (2007, pp. 42-43). To obtain 
bootstrap estimates we follow the suggestion of Simar and Wilson in using 100 replications. Finally, bootstrap 
standard errors (needed to calculate t-statistics) are estimated using 1000 replications.  
 17
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we specify an empirical framework to investigate the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on public sector efficiency (PSE). With this aim we (i) directly measure PSE at 
the country-level by specifying an underlying production process of public goods; and (ii) use 
the new indices and well-established measures of fiscal decentralization to examine their nexus. 
The analysis is carried out on a panel comprising 21 OECD economies for the period 1970-2000. 
Backed by strong empirical results, obtained from several different specifications and sensitivity 
analyses, we contend that public sector efficiency and fiscal decentralization are related in an 
inverted U-shaped way. Therefore, higher fiscal decentralization is beneficial for the efficiency 
of OECD public sectors in providing education and health services; however, if it rises too high 
further decentralization of the public sector is detrimental for PSE.  
This is a new result and may possibly explain the many differences in the findings of 
previous empirical literature that uses either micro data or indirect measures of efficiency to 
characterize the current relationship. Policy implications are straightforward. Countries with 
relatively low levels of fiscal decentralization will benefit from transferring part of their powers 
to local governments. However, countries that already have a highly decentralized fiscal system 
may want to consider reducing the powers of local governments, especially if they face 
diseconomies of scale and / or increased pressure from local interest groups owing to 
decentralization. Clearly, these findings and policy implications call for a deeper understanding 
of the inter- and intra-country mechanisms that create the non-linear pattern and this definitely 
warrants future research. 
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Appendix A. Public sector efficiency indicators: Formulation and sources  
To measure public sector efficiency we follow the rationale of the methodology developed 
by Afonso et al. (2005). The basic insight of this methodology is to compare the performance of 
government in certain areas of economic activity with the associated expenditures that the 
government allocates to achieve this particular performance. Therefore, to construct a PSE index 
the following data are required: (i) some measure capturing Public Sector Performance (PSP) 
that serves as the output, and (ii) some measure of the associated Public Sector Expenditure 
(PEX) that serves as input. The performance (PSP) and expenditure measures (PEX) used to 
construct the PSE indicators for each policy area are described in Table B1 and the summary 
statistics are provided in Table B2 below. 
 
 
Table A1: Public sector efficiency indicators 
 
Policy area Performance measure (PSP) 
 
Expenditure measure (PEX) 
Education 
 
Years of Schooling (Barro and Lee, 2001) multiplied by 
the quality of education index cognitive developed by 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009). 
 
Public spending in education  
(taken from Busemeyer (2007)) 
Health Inverse of the infant mortality rate (taken from OECD 
Health Data ,2007) 
 
Public spending in Health  (taken 
from OECD Health Data, 2007) 
 
 
Table A2: Summary statistics for outputs (PSP) and inputs (PEX) 
 
Outputs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Years of Schooling  8.27 1.901 2.6 12.05 
Quality of education index cognitive  4.95 0.185 4.5 5.3 
Infant mortality rate at birth 10.45 6.308 3.2 55.5 
Ratio of public to total spending on Education 0.89 0.073 0.75 1.00 
Ratio of public to total spending on Health 0.73 0.124 0.41 0.91 
Inputs     
Public spending on education (% of GDP) 5.49 1.19 1.8 10.2 
Public spending on health (% of GDP) 5.31 1.48 1.0 8.0 
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Appendix B.  Data definitions and sources 
 
 Variable  Description Sources 
PSE education 
DEA efficiency scores with public spending on education as 
input (obtained from ) and the product of years of schooling 
and education quality as output 
Own estimations based on 
the methodology described 
in Section 2.1 
PSE health DEA efficiency scores with public spending on health as input and the reverse of infant mortality as output 
Own estimations based on 
the methodology described 
in Section 2.1 
Decentralization: 
taxrevdec 
Sub-central government own tax revenue as a share of 
general government total tax revenue. Stegarescu (2005) 
Decentralization: 
decindex 
Sub-central government Expenditure as a share of  total 
expenditures 
Government Financial 
Statistics, IMF (2002) 
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2000 US dollars) World Development Indicators (2004) 
Population density Number of people per square klm World Development Indicators (2004) 
Urban population Share of urban population to total population World Development Indicators (2004) 
Log of population Logarithm of total population  World Development Indicators (2004) 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization  Index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization La Porta et al. (1999) 
Majoritarian 
systems 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the electoral 
system is majoritarian and 0 otherwise 
Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) 
Presidential 
systems 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the political system 
is presidential and 0 otherwise 
Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) 
British legal origin Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the country has British legal origin and 0 otherwise La Porta et al. (1998) 
Number of 
spending ministers Number of Spending Ministers Mierau et al. (2007) 
Coalition 
government 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if a coalition cabinet is in 
power Tavares (2004) 
Electoral cycle Dummy variable taking the value 1 when elections take place at that year and 0 otherwise Tavares (2004) 
Preferences 
Heterogeneity 
Herfindahl Concentration Indices (for more details see 
Section3.2) 
World Values Survey 
(2000) 
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Table 1  
Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
PSE education 492 0.626 0.216 0.195 1.000 
PSE health 597 0.645 0.222 0.250 1.000 
decentralization: 
taxrevdec 522 0.224 0.171 0.003 0.615 
decentralization:  
decindex 481 31.709 13.768 1.450 59.180 
GDP per capita  650 9.727 0.423 8.317 10.709 
population 
density 620 1.291 1.188 0.016 4.699 
urban population 651 73.536 13.703 25.910 97.340 
log of population 609 16.518 1.431 12.736 19.414 
ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization 651 0.131 0.113 0.003 0.376 
coalition 
governments 633 15.310 4.791 5.000 33.000 
fractionalization 348 0.691 0.036 0.581 0.742 
Note: The table presents the number of observations and summary 
statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) of the 
variables used in the empirical analysis (excluding the dummy 
variables). 
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Table 2 
Correlation matrix 
 
PSE 
educ. 
PSE 
health 
dec. 
(taxrevdec.) 
dec. 
(decindex) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
popul. 
density 
urban 
popul. 
log of 
popul. 
ethno-
ling. 
fract. 
major. 
syst. 
presid. 
syst. 
British 
legal 
origin 
no. 
spend. 
minist. 
coal. 
gov. 
elect. 
cycle 
PSE education 1.000               
PSE health 0.047 1.000              
decentralization 
(taxrevdec) 0.202 0.290 1.000             
decentralization 
(decindex) 0.200 0.436 0.718 1.000            
GDP per capita 0.297 0.179 0.557 0.342 1.000           
population 
density -0.152 -0.125 -0.504 -0.444 -0.114 1.000          
urban 
population 0.357 -0.285 -0.002 0.041 0.206 0.503 1.000         
log of 
population 0.353 0.019 0.029 0.166 0.086 0.173 0.372 1.000        
ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization 0.153 0.101 0.526 0.270 0.205 -0.033 0.202 0.203 1.000       
majoritarian 
systems 0.421 0.060 0.232 0.227 0.014 -0.232 0.266 0.458 0.378 1.000      
presidential 
systems 0.310 0.600 0.435 0.307 0.482 -0.100 -0.141 0.393 0.337 0.200 1.000     
British legal 
origin 0.437 0.110 0.159 0.327 -0.119 -0.276 0.105 0.375 0.318 0.743 0.206 1.000    
number of 
spending 
ministers -0.149 -0.435 0.081 0.038 -0.053 -0.146 0.190 0.227 0.072 0.345 -0.420 0.103 1.000   
coalition 
governments -0.192 0.036 -0.253 -0.194 -0.018 0.311 0.013 -0.301 -0.116 -0.476 -0.139 -0.443 -0.250 1.000  
electoral cycle 0.047 0.077 0.033 0.053 -0.006 -0.062 -0.003 0.054 0.018 0.060 0.071 0.072 0.018 -0.087 1.000 
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Table 3 
Public sector efficiency in providing education services and fiscal decentralization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.319*** 0.310*** 0.345*** 0.246*** 0.357*** GDP per capita 
(12.587) (11.441 (8.734) (5.782) (8.374) 
0.004 0.014*** 0.038*** 0.009 0.030*** population density 
(0.768) (2.591) (6.171) (1.49 (5.154) 
0.000 -0.001** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 urban population 
(0.115) (-2.078) (-1.264) (1.367) (-1.597) 
0.051*** 0.048*** 0.025*** 0.056*** 0.048*** log of population 
(10.694) (9.550) (6.479) (6.413) (5.590) 
-0.078 0.044 -0.163*** 0.036 -0.073 ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (-1.590) (1.021) (-5.803) (0.662) (-1.388) 
0.148*** 0.691*** 0.838*** 0.904*** 0.965*** decentralization 
(taxrevdec) (3.537) (6.631) (10.047) (6.366) (10.597) 
 -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** decentralization 
squared (taxrevdec)  (-5.334) (-10.384) (-6.429) (-10.079) 
  -0.049***  -0.035*** majoritarian 
systems   (-3.540)  (-2.653) 
  0.087*  -0.072 presidential 
systems   (1.924)  (-1.098) 
  0.186***  0.186*** British legal origin 
  (11.771)  (14.851) 
   -0.014*** -0.013*** number of 
spending ministers    (-5.171) (-3.617) 
   -0.022 0.020 coalition 
governments    (-1.061) (0.987) 
   0.001 0.001 electoral cycle 
   (0.035) (0.067) 
-3.368*** -3.203*** -3.250*** -2.627*** -3.551*** constant term 
(-16.531) (-14.588) (-10.125) (-8.562) (-10.366) 
observations 390 390 390 390 390 
censored 
observations 48 48 48 48 48 
Wald test 2848.459 3167.458 9687.954 2487.518 6662.182 
p-value of Wald 
test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance 
respectively. The Wald test and the associated p-value reflect the joint significance of the coefficients. 
All equations are estimated using a panel data Tobit method. 
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Table 4 
Public sector efficiency in providing health services and fiscal decentralization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.147*** 0.128*** -0.052* 0.077*** -0.027 GDP per capita 
(6.962) (5.789) (-1.659) (2.779) (-0.895) 
0.079*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.078*** 0.090*** population density 
(15.742) (17.347) (13.386) (12.094) (12.228) 
-0.012*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.009*** urban population 
(-17.033) (-19.701) (-10.155) (-16.606) (-8.957) 
0.063*** 0.061*** 0.020*** 0.076*** 0.036*** log of population 
(13.560) (13.013) (2.712) (17.128) (3.798) 
-0.268*** -0.109 -0.345*** -0.185* -0.321*** ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (-3.088) (-1.252) (-5.301) (-1.957) (-4.107) 
0.812*** 1.781*** 1.885*** 1.790*** 1.884*** decentralization 
(taxrevdec) (11.677) (10.152) (15.275) (10.077) (13.153) 
 -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.017*** -0.020*** decentralization 
squared (taxrevdec)  (-6.182) (-8.856) (-5.449) (-7.648) 
  -0.072***  -0.042 majoritarian 
systems   (-2.583)  (-1.363) 
  0.587***  0.447* presidential systems 
  (2.607)  (1.728) 
  0.076**  0.062** British legal origin 
  (2.250)  (1.990) 
   -0.025*** -0.012*** number of spending 
ministers    (-10.772) (-3.873) 
   -0.007 0.004 coalition 
governments    (-0.373) (0.255) 
   0.028* 0.013 electoral cycle 
   (1.959) (0.849) 
-1.175*** -0.940*** 1.143*** -0.465* 0.848*** constant term 
(-6.174) (-4.849) (4.211) (-1.870) (3.103) 
observations 451 451 451 450 450 
censored 
observations 85 85 85 85 85 
Wald test 1783.863 1622.352 3828.872 1430.233 5415.059 
p-value of Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance 
respectively. The Wald test and the associated p-value reflect the joint significance of the coefficients. 
All equations are estimated using a panel data Tobit method. 
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Table 5 
Public sector efficiency and fiscal decentralization: 2SLS regressions 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Efficiency in education Efficiency in health 
First-stage results   
13.930*** 10.263** Preference heterogeneity 
(2.820) (2.570) 
-12.910*** -9.769*** Preference heterogeneity 
squared (-3.371) (-3.138) 
Second-stage results 
0.196** -0.264*** GDP per capita 
(2.504) (-3.217) 
-0.013 0.127*** population density (-0.609) (8.380) 
0.001 -0.013*** urban population (0.557) (-10.785) 
0.122*** 0.032*** log of population (5.838) (3.048) 
0.306 -0.196 ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (1.293) (-1.550) 
3.842*** 3.793*** decentralization 
(taxrevdec) (7.074) (7.655) 
-7.075*** -5.367*** decentralization squared 
(taxrevdec) (-5.906) (-6.830) 
-0.270*** -0.032 majoritarian systems (-3.363) (-0.959) 
-0.493*** 0.144*** presidential systems (-7.073) (2.741) 
0.385*** 0.176*** British legal origin (9.970) (5.166) 
-0.015*** -0.014*** number of spending 
ministers (-2.650) (-3.214) 
-0.020 0.019 coalition governments (-0.611) (0.746) 
0.006 0.005 electoral cycle (0.289) (0.305) 
observations 223 292 
R-squared 0.608 0.555 
Under-identification test 
(p-value) 
26.216 
(0.000) 
30.868 
(0.000) 
Weak identification test 14.711 37.469 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of 
statistical significance respectively. We report an under-identification test and 
its p-value, which is the Anderson’s (1951) canonical correlation test; we also 
report the weak identification test of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Both 
equations are estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS) with fixed effects 
and robust standard errors. 
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Table 6 
Public sector efficiency in providing education services and fiscal decentralization: Sensitivity analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0.052 0.530*** 0.030 0.399*** 0.380*** 0.421*** GDP per capita 
(-0.615) (7.387) (0.562) (6.917) (8.731) (7.140) 
-0.000 0.020*** -0.011 0.037*** 0.022** 0.031*** population density 
(-0.007) (2.922) (-1.435) (5.080) (2.152) (3.842) 
0.005*** -0.000 0.003*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.003** urban population 
(4.628) (-0.262) (3.435) (-6.168) (-0.982) (-2.515) 
-0.01 0.047*** 0.139*** 0.074*** 0.045*** 0.051*** log of population 
(-1.206) (5.095) (14.956) (4.579) (4.030) (6.042) 
0.015 0.023 -0.065 0.017 -0.045 -0.084 ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (0.182) (0.308) (-0.751) (0.126) (-0.423) (-1.604) 
1.430***      decentralization 
(decindex) (4.529)      
-0.022***      decentralization squared 
(decindex) (-4.293)      
 0.873*** 2.139*** 1.461*** 0.744*** 0.714*** decentralization 
(taxrevdec)  (9.261) (12.314) (8.937) (3.398) (7.003) 
 -0.014*** -0.036*** -0.023*** -0.011*** -0.011*** decentralization squared 
(taxrevdec)  (-9.141) (-12.338) (-10.026) (-3.079) (-5.082) 
0.064** -0.060*** -0.194*** -0.033 -0.031 -0.033*** majoritarian systems 
(2.574) (-4.752) (-8.397) (-0.837) (-0.906) (-2.603) 
0.250*** -0.134 -0.276*** -0.348*** -0.088* -0.065 presidential systems 
(2.808) (-1.644) (-5.043) (-4.390) (-1.835) (-0.902) 
0.065** 0.243*** 0.294*** 0.269*** 0.182*** 0.180*** British legal origin 
(2.116) (13.017) (12.449) (12.210) (7.150) (9.865) 
-0.005* -0.014*** -0.007* -0.031*** -0.013*** -0.016*** number of spending 
ministers (-1.659) (-3.292) (-1.857) (-7.329) (-4.711) (-5.840) 
-0.020 0.037* 0.080*** -0.052* 0.019 -0.034 coalition governments 
(-0.960) (1.748) (4.168) (-1.742) (1.030) (-1.403) 
-0.002 -0.001 0.016 0.002 0.002 0.002 electoral cycle 
(-0.073) (-0.065) (1.032) (0.064) (0.114) (0.174) 
0.744 -5.284*** -2.393*** -4.459*** -3.708*** -2.800*** constant term 
(0.906) (-7.750) (-5.798) (-8.135) (-8.875) (-4.901) 
observations 345 371 288 199 390 390 
censored observations 30 48 31   48 
Wald test 1363.599 2360.372 6547.596 6883.492   
p-value of Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. 
The Wald test and the associated p-value reflect the joint significance of the coefficients. Equations (1)-(3) are 
estimated using a panel data Tobit method, equation (4) using a fixed effects panel data model, equation (5) 
using a panel data random effects model and equation (6) using the Simar and Wilson (2007) method. In 
equation (2) we exclude the Mediterranean countries from the sample and in equation (3) we exclude 
Scandinavian countries. 
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Table 7 
Public sector efficiency in providing health services and fiscal decentralization: Sensitivity analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0.117** 0.000 0.153*** -0.093 -0.115*** 0.161*** GDP per capita 
(-2.313) (0.003) (2.759) (-1.059) (-2.745) (2.914) 
-0.006 0.120*** 0.080*** 0.031** 0.074*** 0.083*** population density 
(-0.442) (11.670) (8.084) (2.170) (7.564) (8.560) 
-0.001 -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.007*** urban population 
(-0.520) (-11.557) (-9.150) (-6.635) (-7.540) (-6.452) 
-0.046*** 0.010 -0.043** 0.177*** 0.025** 0.061*** log of population 
(-3.705) (0.760) (-1.968) (7.966) (2.438) (5.322) 
-0.247*** -0.560*** -0.456*** 0.331* -0.355*** -0.363*** ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (-2.771) (-5.054) (-5.629) (1.908 (-3.701) (-4.504) 
-0.691*      decentralization 
(decindex) (-1.873)      
0.015**      decentralization squared 
(decindex) (2.364)      
 1.945*** 2.148*** 2.698*** 1.828*** 1.047*** decentralization 
(taxrevdec)  (14.156) (9.662) (8.889) (8.617) (4.753) 
 -0.018*** -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.021*** -0.016*** decentralization squared 
(taxrevdec)  (-6.092) (-8.123) (-7.398) (-5.789) (-3.255) 
0.088* 0.052 0.012 -0.380*** -0.027 0.011 majoritarian systems 
(1.845) (1.410) (0.306) (-4.982) (-0.838) (0.281) 
0.795*** 0.483* 0.512* -0.418*** 0.230*** 0.608*** presidential systems 
(3.149) (1.724) (1.736) (-5.521) (4.694) (2.715) 
-0.067** 0.073** -0.038 0.056 0.058** 0.068** British legal origin 
(-2.439) (2.210) (-0.735) (1.526) (2.127) (2.122) 
-0.009*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.028*** -0.010*** -0.017*** number of spending 
ministers (-4.240) (-3.398) (-4.573) (-7.341) (-3.534) (-4.159) 
0.009 0.053*** -0.067*** -0.042 0.003 0.001 coalition governments 
(0.374) (2.582) (-2.725) (-1.015) (0.192) (0.092) 
0.006 0.018 0.018 0.008 0.01 0.022 electoral cycle 
(0.513) (1.121) (0.857) (0.272) (0.624) (1.257) 
2.769*** 1.059** 0.56 -0.977 1.731*** -0.251 constant 
(4.731) (2.003) (1.551) (-1.051) (4.164) (-1.042) 
observations 389 407 330 262 450 450 
censored observations 50 85 66   85 
Wald test 289.147 4110.817 1255.415 4531.276   
p-value of Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. 
The Wald test and the associated p-value reflect the joint significance of the coefficients. Equations (1)-(3) are 
estimated using a Tobit model, equation (4) using a fixed effects panel data model, equation (4) using a panel 
data random effects model and equation (6) using the Simar and Wilson (2007) method. In equation (2) we 
exclude the Mediterranean countries from the sample and in equation (3) we exclude Scandinavian countries. 
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Figure 1 
PSE in providing education (EduEff) and health (HealthEff) services 
DEA effciency scores for EduEff 
(10-years average, period 1970-1979)
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DEA effciency scores for EduEff 
(10-years average, period 1980-1989)
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DEA effciency scores for EduEff 
(10-years average, period 1990-1999)
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DEA effciency scores for EduEff 
(10-years average, year 2000)
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DEA effciency scores for HealthEff 
(10-years average, period 1970-1979)
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DEA effciency scores for HealthEff 
(10-years average, period 1980-1989)
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DEA effciency scores for HealthEff 
(10-years average, period 1990-1999)
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DEA effciency scores for HealthEff 
(10-years average, year 2000)
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